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NOTES AND COMMENT
come should not be pyramided into the year of change inasmuch as it
is income attributable to other accounting periods.
PAUL M. CARRUTHERS
Workmen's Compensation-"Accidental" Injury-an Anachronism
A 1953 Mississippi decision' has added one more drop to the ocean
of confusion concerning the legal meaning of the word "accident."
There a baker contracted a skin allergy from the use of a baker's pad
in handling hot pans of bread. After testimony by a dermatologist to
the effect that the employee was allergic to some material or chemical
in the pad, the attorney-referee awarded compensation on the basis of
"accidental" injury and the entire Commission affirmed.2 On appeal
the Mississippi Supreme Court refused to overturn the finding, agree-
ing that this was an "accidental" injury within the purview of the
Mississippi statute.8
To understand the decision, it is first necessary to briefly examine
the theory underlying Workmen's Compensation. In an economic
society containing as one of its basic essentials a large group of laborers,
it is desirable for the well being of all integrated society to protect
this group from industrial accidents which seem inevitable in the in-
dustrial machine.4 To accomplish this end the economic burden is
placed upon industry rather than upon workers and their dependents,
who might otherwise well become wards of the State.5 And since this
benefit is directly for the laborer and only indirectly for the society,
Workmen's Compensation Acts should be construed liberally in favor
of the employee.6
'Hardin's Bakeries, Inc. v. Ranager, 64 So. 2d 705 (Miss. 1953).
'Under Mississippi procedure, hearings may be conducted by a Commissioner
or a representative of the Commission, who grants or denies compensation and
then' files his decision with the Commission. This decision is final unless within
twenty days a request or petition for review by the full Commission is made.
Appeal may be made from the Commission's finding within thirty days to the
Circuit Court of the county in -which the injury occurred, this appeal being
based only upon the record as made before the Commission. Finally, appeal may
be taken to the Supreme Court of Mississippi. Miss. LAWS 1948, c. 354, §§ 18,20.
'Miss. LAWS 1948, c. 354, as amended by Miss. LAWS 1950, c. 412.
'Bowen v. Hocldey, 71 F. 2d 781 (4th Cir. 1934).
'Tedars v. Savannah River Veneer Co., 202 S. C. 363, 25 S.E. 2d 235 (1943)
'Employers Mutual Liability Ins. Co. of Wis. v. Konvicka, 197 F. 2d 691
(5th Cir. 1952); Beck v. National Sur. Corp., 171 F. 2d 862 (5th Cir. 1949);
Peterson v. Moran, 111 Cal. App. 2d 766, 245 P. 2d 540 (1952); Danziger v.
Industrial Accident Comm., 109 Cal. App. 71, 292 Pac. 525 (1930); Shockley v.
King, 31 Del. 606, 171 Atl. 280 (1922); Di Giorgio Fruit Corp. v. Pittman, 49
So. 2d 600 (Fla. 1950) ; Guevara v. Inland Steel Co., 120 Ind. App. 47, 88 N.E.
2d 398 (1949); Forcade v. List and Clark Const. Co., 172 Kan. 119, 238 P. 2d
549 (1951); Alexander v. Chrysler Motor Parts Corp., 167 Kan. 711, 207 P. 2d
1179 (1949); Jurich v. Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co., 233 Minn. 108, 46 N.W. 2d
237 (1951); Brookhaven Steam Laundry v. Watts, 214 Miss. 569, 55 So. 2d
381 (1951); McWilliams v. Southern Bleaching and Printing Works, 216 S. C.
121, 57 S.E. 2d 26 (1949); Thornton v. R. C. A. Service Co., 188 Tenn. 644,
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But even liberality must have its boundaries, if law is truly to pro-
duce justice. Thus, we find irritated Justinians admonishing: "(The
court) may not add to, nor detract from, the statute. The court must
take the statute as it is, not as it may think it should be."'7 Again: "We
cannot reconstruct the act, we can only interpret it." Or even further:
"The statute should be given a liberal interpretation, but liberality
should not be stretched into extravagance."
What then has been the occasion for this controversy? Basically
it would seem to be a conflict between a liberal construction in order
to effectuate the purpose of the Acts and common law notions of legal
liability. To go into all the possible ramifications of this conflict is
not the purpose here.10 Rather we seek to examine one of the most
controversial areas-what constitutes an "accident" as referred to in
the statutes and as related to the principal case.
Under most Workmen's Compensation Acts," not only must the
injury arise out of and in the course of the employment,1 2 but in the
majority of the Acts it must also be accidental. 18 Some courts have
interpreted "accident" as an unlooked for and untoward event, not
expected or designed ;14 it has been called a "fortuitous" event;15 or "a
quality or condition .. .of happening, coming by chance or without
design, or taking place unexpectedly or unintentionally";10 often, but
221 S.W. 2d 954 (1949); Industrial Accident Board v. Miears, 149 Tex. 270,
227 S.W. 2d 571 (1950); Jones v. California Packing Corp., 244 P. 2d 640 (Utah
1952).
Royal Indemnity Co. v. J. G. White Engineering Corp., 120 Misc. 332, 337,
198 N. Y. Supp. 264, 269 (Sup. Ct. 1923).
'Paterno's Case, 266 Mass. 323, 327, 165 N.E. 391, 392 (1929).
'In re Sickles, 171 App. Div. 108, 109, 156 N. Y. Supp. 864, 865 (3d Dep't.
1916). See also Matlock v. Industrial Commission, 70 Ariz. 25, 215 P 2d 612
(1950); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 69 Ariz. 280, 212
P. 2d 1001 (1950); Sanderson and Porter v. Crow, 214 Ark. 416, 216 S.W. 2d
796 (1949) ; In re Martinelli, 219 Mass. 58, 106 N.E. 557 (1914) ; Deemer Lumber
Co. v. Hamilton, 211 Miss. 673, 52 So. 2d 634 (1951); Simon v. Standard Oil
Co., 150 Neb. 799, 36 N.W. 2d 102 (1949); Henry v. A. C. Lawrence Leather
Co., 231 N. C. 477, 57 S.E. 2d 760 (1950); In re Trent's Claim, 68 Wyo. 146,
231 P. 2d 180 (1951).
"'For a comprehensive study of accidental injury, see 1 LARSON, WORKMAN'S
COMPENSATON LAW §§ 37.00-42.24 (1st ed. 1952).
"For a compilation of all Workmen's Compensation statutes, see ScHNEIDER,
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION STATUTES, 6 vols. (Perm. ed. 1939-1949).
1 LARSON, WoRXMEX's COMPENSATION LAW, § 6.10, pp. 41-43 (1st ed. 1952).
1 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW, §37.10, pp. 511-512 (1st ed.
1952).
1'New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Humphrey, 47 F. 2d 57 (5th Cir. 1931);
Fidelity and Casualty Co. of New York v. Industrial Accident Comm. of Calif.,
177 Cal. 614, 171 Pac. 429 (1918); Jefferson Printing Co. v. Industrial Comm.,
312 Ill. 575, 144 N.E. 356 (1924); Woodruff v. Howes Const. Co., 228 N. Y.
276, 127 N.E. 270 (1920); Withers v. Black, 230 N. C. 428, 53 S.E. 2d 668
(1949).
"9Benjamin F. Shaw Co. v. Musgrave, 189 Tenn. 1, 222 S.W. 2d 22 (1949);
Zappala v. Ind. Ins. Comm., 82 Wash. 314, 144 Pac. 54 (1914).
1" Gulf Oil Corp. v. Rouse, 202 Okla. 395, 397, 214 P. 2d 251, 253 (1949).
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not necessarily, accompanied by a manifestation of force-.1' Other
courts have added as a valuable ingredient a definite time, place, and
occasion.' 8 Or it may simply be interpreted as an "accident" in the
popular sense of the word.19
How do these definitions apply to the principal case? Certainly
the allergy was unexpected, undesigned, untoward, unintentional, and
fortuitous. No definite time can be ascertained, but courts vary as to
what constitutes a definite time and place. Some say an accident does
not happen over an entire day, others hold that it may require six
months for an accident to culminate.2 0  "No stated period can be given
. . . as applied to each case, each must naturally depend on its own
circumstances."
'21
But what of the requirement of the ordinary, popular sense of the
word? Justice Cardozo once dealt with the problem in Connally v.
Hunt Furniture Co., 22 where an embalmer's helper was infected by
poison entering an abrasion on his hand while working on a corpse.
In the majority opinion, affirming an award, Cardozo wrote:
"Germs may indeed be inhaled through the nose or mouth, or
absorbed into the system through normal channels of entry. In
such cases their inroads will seldom, if ever, be assignable to a
determinate or single act, identified in space or time. . . . For
this, as well as for the reason that the absorption is incidental to
a bodily process both natural and normal, their action presents
itself to the mind as a disease, and not as an accident (italics
added). Our mental attitude is different when the channel of
infection is abnormal or traumatic, a lesion or cut.
' '23
Several early cases have also applied such a distinction. Thus
compensation was denied where infection followed from an employee's
dipping his hand into a staining solution, there being no evidence of
a scratch or abrasion ;24 where a plumber contracted an infection of the
eye from a particle falling into it, or by wiping his face with an infected
towel-again no prior abrasion ;25 where infection resulted from use
of a chemical solution in developing photographic plates ;20 and where
"'Winkelman v. Boeing Airplane Co., 166 Kan. 503, 203 P. 2d 171 (1949).
"8Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 171 F. 2d 723 (5th Cir. 1948); Great
Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. Sexton, 242 Ky. 266, 46 S.W. 2d 87 (1932).
" Winkelman v. Boeing Airplane Co., 166 Kan. 503, 203 P. 2d 171 (1949)." 4 SCHNEMER, WORKMEN'S COmPENSATION 387 (Perm. ed. 1945).
21 S. H. Kress and Co. v. Burkes, 153 Fla. 868, 870, 16 So. 2d 106, 107 (1944).
22240 N. Y. 83, 147 N.E. 366 (1925).
2' Connally v. Hunt Furniture Co., 240 N. Y. 83, 85, 147 N.E. 366, 367 (1925).
24 Jenner v. Imperial Furniture Co., 200 Mich. 265, 166 N.W. 943 (1918).
25 Voelz v. Industrial Comm., 161 Wis. 240, 152 N.W. 830 (1915).
-' Jeffreys v. Charles H. Sager Co., 233 N. Y. 535, 135 N.E. 907 (1922), af-
firming 198 App. Div. 446, 191 N. Y. Supp. 354 (3rd Dep't 1921).
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dermatitis resulted from washing out ink cans with a solution of caustic
soda.
27
Several later cases have turned on similar grounds. In 1936, the
Ohio Supreme Court refused compensation from irritations to an em-
ployee's face caused by peach stains in a towel on the basis of a lack
of causal relation, but by way of dictum stated that even were the
causal relation present, there was no accident, for the unusual or ex-
ceptional physical condition of the employee was not a legal trauma.28
A 1944 Florida decision refused compensation where a bakery employee
developed knots in her wrists from mixing dough, baking bread, and
scrubbing pans. The court based its finding on the lack of an unex-
pected, or unusual, sudden injury, as the Act required.29 In a 1952
Missouri case, an employee sustained injuries to his face, right side,
and ear by dust and dirty cotton lodgin to which he was exposed in
a cotton warehouse. In denying recovery, the court said there was no
impact, and that the exposure was usual.8 0
However, Cardozo's distinction between the normal and the ab-
normal channels as a guide to the common meaning of "accident" has,
for the most part, given way to other legal interpretations, with the
real question centering around causal connection. Thus lung cancer
from inhaling dust,31 back injury where the strain was usual,3 2 cerebral
hemorrhage from excitement 3 or exertion,3 4 coronary thrombosis caused
by nervousness while driving at night in a dense fog,85 skin disease
from exposure to the sun,36 coughs spreading germs, 7 and sunstroke 8
7 Cheek v. Harmsworth Brothers, 4 W. C. C. 3 (Eng. 1901).
8 Industrial Comm. of Ohio v. Zelmanovitz, 53 Ohio App. 92, 4 N.E. 2d
265 (1936).29FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.02 (1952); S. H. Kress and Co. v. Burkes, 153
Fla. 868, 16 So. 2d 106 (1944). The Florida Court on the same grounds refused
compensation in Travelers Ins. Co. v. Shepard, 20 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 1945) (derma-
titis from packing oranges) ; City of Tallahassee v. Roberts, 21 So. 2d 712 (Fla.
1945) (injured vertebra). But see Meehan v. Crowder, 28 So. 2d 435, 437 (Fla.
1946), where compensation was granted for an injury over a three day period,
the court saying: "The event here is the sudden entry of the poisonous fumes into
Crowder's body."
"Rogers v. Sikeston Compress and Warehouse Co., 248 S.W. 2d 672 (Mo.
1952).
8" Scobey v. Southern Lumber Co., 218 Ark. 671, 238 S.W. 2d 640 (1951).
2 Nelson v. Ford Motor Co., 13 N. J. Super. 56, 80 A. 2d 235 (1951).
8 St. Dept. of Revenue v. Snelling, 84 Ga. App. 238, 65 S.E. 2d 822 (1951).
8 Bealer v. Town of Amherst, 278 App. Div. 993, 105 N. Y. S. 2d 772 (3d
Dep't 1951).
3 McNess v. Cincinnati St. Ry. Co., 90 Ohio App. 223, 101 N.E. 2d 1 (1951).
8' Pan American Airways v. Willard, 99 F. Supp. 257 (S. D. N. Y. 1951).
McRae v. Unemployment Compens. Comm., 217 N. C. 769, 9 S.E. 2d 595
(1940), commented on in 39 Micr. L. REv. 834 (1941). In view of this case it
would seem that the North Carolina Court takes a liberal view as to what con-
stitutes an "accident" as applied to Workmen's Compensation, for the Court
there found a cough which spread disease germs to be an "accident." Whether
the same liberality would be evidenced on the facts of the principal case is open
to conjecture. But the step from a cough to wearing gloves is not a large one,
[Vol. 32
NOTES AND COMMENT
are but a few of the recently classified "accidents," when all, or cer-
tainly most, would not be so classified in common parlance.
Thus, it is seen that in the application of the word "accident" there
has grown up in the courts a legal and judicial meaning far different
from the layman's definition and understanding, which the legislatures
probably intended in first using the term. The principal case is but one
more example of this. To the layman, the baker's injury would not
be an accident, nor would it be an occupational disease, as it is not
peculiar to bakers or to their working environment-it would simply
be what it was, a skin disease caused by the employment. For if this
were an accident, then almost any action, even a prolonged one, with
an unfortunate result could logically be deemed the same. However,
where there is a causal connection between the employment and the
injury, the legal trend is unmistakably toward such a result; to refuse
to recognize this or to advocate reversal is to play the role of the ostrich
and the sand.
The effect then is to render the word "accident" practically useless in
compensation cases, except as rationale to circumvent a statute saying
such is necessary. Courts responding to economic, political, and social
trends of the past thirty years have to that effect legislated. And though,
as Justice Cardozo wrote, there are "interstitial" areas where judicial
legislation becomes desirable,80 there is a constant danger of judicial
legislation being substituted for judicial interpretation.
In light of the aforementioned trend, the principal case reaches a
sound result. In actuality it carries rationalization one step further
to reach a desired result. It would be far more desirable if Workmen's
Compensation Acts did not include the element of accident (as some
do not),4 for it presents a roadblock to the sociological purpose of the
Acts, which is becoming less effective with more liberal interpretations,
but which, at the same time, has created an unhealthy trend toward
for allergy from pads is far less common and unexpected than disease spread
by coughs. For a compilation of North Carolina cases on accidental injury,
see N. C. W. C. A. ANx. § 97.2 (F) (1952).
" Commissioner of Tax and Finance v. Wickwire Spencer Steel Co., 279
App. Div. 1124, 112 N. Y. S. 2d 527 (3d Dep't 1952).
CAnnozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDIc.AL PROCESS, pp. 98-141 (5th ed. 1925).
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.141 (1950); OHIO GEN. CODE ANN. § 1465-37
(1946); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art 8306 (1925) ; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 2494
(1949); Wyo. ComP. STAT. ANN. § 72-101 (1943). But even the courts of these
states have read "accident!' into the Acts. See Marlow v. Huron Mountain
Club, 271 Mich. 107, 260 N.W. 130 (1935); Malone v. Industrial Commission,
140 Ohio St. 292, 43 N.E. 2d 266 (1942); Middleton v. Texas Power and Light
Co., 108 Tex. 96, 185 S.W. 556 (1916); Martin v. St. Compensation Conmis-
sioner, 107 W. Va. 583, 149 S.E. 824 (1929); In re Scrogham, 73 P. 2d 300
(Wyo. 1937). For a vigorous dissent to judicial inclusion of the word accident,
see Hagopian v. Highland Park, 313 Mich. 608, 22 N.W. 2d 116 (1920).
1954]
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legal rationalization 41 which may become infectious and spread to other
areas of the law.
PETER G. KALOGRIDIS
' Some courts are more pointed: "It (the injury) cannot be attributed to the
occupation because it is not a disease which men in that occupation are subject
to contract; it is not a disease known to be incidental to that particular employ-
ment. Then it is the result of the accident or else we have a situation uender the
Workmen's Compensation Act where an employee contracts a disease out of
and in the course of his employment, and, yet not compensable (italics added).
Vogt v. Ford Motor Co., 138 S.W. 2d 684, 687 (Mo. App. 1940).
